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Abstract
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check
whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with indepen-
dent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at
an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, de-
scribe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable
if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the par-
tition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion
in auctions in which the bidders￿￿nal utility possibly depends on the
winner￿ s identity. We show that such direct externalities o⁄er a pos-
sible explanation for cartels￿structures (not) observed in practice.
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11 Introduction
Collusion in auctions is mostly studied as a mechanism design problem for
a given ring (see, e.g., Graham and Marshall (1987), Mailath and Zemsky
(1991) and McAfee and McMillan (1992) for early references and Marshall
and Marx (2007) for a recent one). This framework imposes individual par-
ticipation constraint to every member of the ring. In second price auctions
with independent private values, Mailath and Zemsky (1991) further consider
participation constraints for all subrings of any potential ring. In this partic-
ular framework, equilibria in weakly dominant strategies considerably limit
the strategic externalities that coalitions might incur. Mailath and Zemsky
(1991)￿ s analysis does not extend if equilibria in weakly dominant strate-
gies do not exist, e.g., in the case of common values (see Barbar and Forges
(2007)). In this paper, we keep the assumption of independent private values
but except for that, allow for an arbitrary auction game. We ask whether a
given coalition is stable, in the sense that no subgroup of players would like to
leave it. Such collective participation constraints are traditionally captured
by core-like solution concepts. However, two di¢ culties arise when trying to
de￿ne the core of an arbitrary auction game, or, more generally, a Bayesian
game.
A ￿rst di¢ culty, which already appears under complete information, is
that every coalition faces strategic externalities, so that it must make con-
jectures on the behavior of the players who are outside the coalition. To
solve this di¢ culty, Aumann (1961) introduced the ￿￿ characteristic func-
tion, which measures the worth of a coalition in a strategic form game as the
amount that it can guarantee whatever the complementary coalition does.
However, the corresponding core, namely the ￿￿core, can be criticized on the
grounds that it involves incredible threats from the complementary coalition.
As a remedy, Ray and Vohra (1997) and Ray (2007) construct a partition
form game (as de￿ned by Lucas and Thrall (1963)) in which, given a parti-
tion of the players, coalitions evaluate their worth at a Nash equilibrium of
an auxiliary game between the coalitions. We extend Ray (2007)￿ s coalitional
equilibrium to games with incomplete information and construct a partition
form game from the noncooperative Bayesian game which models the auc-
tion. We then apply a notion of core for partition form games, the core with
￿cautious expectations￿(see Hafalir (2007)). Under complete information,
it is included in the ￿￿core.
In a coalitional equilibrium of a Bayesian game, it is understood that the
2strategy of every coalition is a function of its members￿private information.
The description of the previous paragraph hides a second di¢ culty, which is
speci￿c to incomplete information: every coalition faces incentive constraints.
We establish (in proposition 1 and its corollary) that, in a class of Bayesian
games which includes standard auctions (namely, games with independent
private values and quasi-linear utilities), this di¢ culty can be ignored: every
coalitional equilibrium can be made incentive compatible. More precisely,
coalitional equilibria are ￿￿rst best￿solutions, in which every coalition plays
a best reply to the strategies outside the coalition, as if information sharing
was not an issue. We construct an incentive compatible revelation mechanism
for the coalition, which involves exactly balanced monetary transfers among
its members and achieves the ￿￿rst best￿reply of the coalition. The fact
that the coalition maximizes its payo⁄given strategies in the complementary
coalition is crucial to our construction, in particular, in the formulation of
incentive constraints.
In order to associate a partition form (cooperative) game to a (noncoop-
erative) Bayesian game, we assume that coalitions can commit to an incen-
tive compatible mechanism at the ex ante stage, i.e., before their members
get their private information. This assumption ￿rst requires that an ex ante
stage can be identi￿ed, which is true in many economic applications, like
auctions, in which private information reduces to the value of some parame-
ter, like a valuation or a cost. According to empirical data (see, e.g., Porter
and Zona (1993), Pesendorfer (2000)), bidding rings often consist of well-
identi￿ed groups (e.g., ￿incumbents￿ , as opposed to ￿newcomers￿ ) whose
characteristics do not depend on particular information states. Such bidding
rings typically form at an early stage. For instance, local suppliers may be
aware that a procurement auction will take place and consider to collude be-
fore the precise project speci￿cations are published. At the time they commit
to a collusion mechanism, they do not ￿gure out their exact valuations, i.e.,
the costs incurred by the project.
The ex ante formation of rings is assumed explicitly in Bajari (2001),
Marshall et al. (1994) and Waehrer (1999). In these papers, ring mecha-
nisms are investigated within an a priori given partition of the bidders. The
partition itself does not depend on the bidders￿private information, which
re￿ ects the ex ante formation of the rings. To the best of our knowledge,
interim formation of rings has only been investigated to a limited extent,
e.g., in Graham and Marshall (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1992), Cail-
laud and Jehiel (1998) and Marshall and Marx (2007). These papers focus
3on an ex ante given bidding ring, the grand coalition for instance, and for-
mulate interim participation constraints for the individual members of the
ring. More precisely, every member of the ring can decide to leave the ring
once he knows his private information. The precise form of the participa-
tion constraints depends on the reaction of ring members when one of them
leaves the ring. Mailath and Zemsky (1991) start with the latter model but
restrict themselves on ex ante expected payo⁄s when studying the stability
of rings. Being interested in the participation constraints of coalitions, rather
than individuals, we assume, to keep the analysis tractable, that coalitions
can commit to an incentive compatible mechanism ex ante, as in Forges and
Minelli (2001) and Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002). These papers intro-
duce the notion of ex ante incentive compatible core in exchange economies
with di⁄erential information. In this setup, there are no externalities, i.e.,
only the second di¢ culty above arises. The basic solution concept in the
present paper is an ex ante incentive compatible core for Bayesian games.1
Coming back to auctions, we construct a partition form game, which
re￿ ects the ex ante commitments of bidding rings. A coalition is core-stable
if all its subcoalitions agree to participate in its collusion mechanism. In this
de￿nition, we focus on a single ring and assume, as in Marshall and Marx
(2007), that the bidders outside the ring do not collude. We ￿rst apply the
solution concept to standard auctions, without direct externalities. In the
case of second price auctions, possibly with asymmetric players, our partition
form game reduces to a characteristic function and we prove in proposition
2 that all rings are core-stable. In particular, strategic externalities have
limited e⁄ects on collusion. Mailath and Zemsky (1991) already obtain this
result. They directly focus on the equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies
so that they can deal with every coalition separately, without taking account
of possible externalities. They thus face a single mechanism design problem
for every coalition and derive a characteristic function.
In ￿rst price auctions, we derive a genuine partition form game. As
is well-known, asymmetric bidders are di¢ cult to handle in this case (see
1Forges, Minelli and Vohra (2002) discuss interim collective participation constraints
in the absence of externalities. The latter assumption takes the form of ￿orthogonal
coalitions￿in Myerson (1984)￿ s study of interim binding agreements in Bayesian games
and in Myerson (2007)￿ s de￿nition of an interim incentive compatible core. A. Kalai and
E. Kalai (2009) propose a cooperative-competitive solution to two-person Bayesian games.
They consider interim participation but with only two players, incentives only matter for
the grand coalition, which does not face externalities.
4Krishna (2002)). Lebrun (1991, 1999), Marshall et al. (1994), Waehrer
(1999) and Bajari (2001)) introduce bidding rings in ￿rst price auctions as
prototypes of asymmetric bidders. However, in these papers, rings operate as
single entities, which automatically share their information, without relying
on any (incentive compatible) mechanism. It follows from our proposition 1
that this simplifying assumption is fully justi￿ed if bidding rings can make
inside transfers. Thanks to results of Lebrun (1999) and Waehrer (1999), we
establish that the grand coalition is always core-stable in a ￿rst price auction
(proposition 3). In the absence of general, analytical solutions for ￿rst price
auctions with asymmetric bidders, we only check that all coalitions are core-
stable in two speci￿c examples, borrowed from McAfee and McMillan (1992)
and Marshall et al. (1994).
We ￿nally consider the e⁄ect of direct externalities on collusion. We ￿rst
assume, as in Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996)￿ s model, that a bidder su⁄ers
more if a competitor wins the auction than if the object is not sold at all
(￿negative externalities￿ ). We check to which extent the grand coalition is
(not) core-stable in this case. We then propose a three person ￿rst price auc-
tion game in which a two bidder ring is not stable. If direct externalities
can possibly be positive, we show that the grand coalition is not core-stable
and that there exist ￿small￿(i.e., non-singleton) rings which are core-stable.
All these examples con￿rm that direct externalities make cooperative behav-
ior di¢ cult, which was already suggested in Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996),
but we give a more precise content to that phenomenon. Indeed, Jehiel and
Moldovanu (1996) only show that, under reasonable assumptions, no agree-
ment between (some of) the buyers and/or the seller can be stable. They
thus depart from collusion of the bidders in the original auction game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the model and
solution concept. In subsection 2.1, we de￿ne coalitional equilibria in games
with incomplete information. In subsection 2.2, we address the issue of incen-
tives. Proposition 1 and its corollary state that every coalitional equilibrium
become incentive compatible once appropriate balanced transfers are made
in every coalition. In subsection 2.3, we propose a notion of core-stability for
a bidding ring, which does not necessarily gather all the bidders. In section
3, we apply core-stability to auctions. As a benchmark, we consider standard
auctions (second price in subsection 3.1 and ￿rst price in subsection 3.2). In
subsection 3.3, we turn to auctions with direct externalities.
52 Model and solution concept
2.1 From Bayesian games to cooperative games





namely a set of players N and for every player i, i 2 N,
￿ a set of types Ti
￿ a probability distribution qi over Ti
￿ a set of actions Ai
￿ a utility function ui : Ti ￿ A ! R, where A =
Y
i2N Ai.
Let P be a coalition structure, namely a partition of N. From ￿ and P, we





which the players are the coalitions S, S 2 P, and
￿ TS =
Y
i2S Ti, qS =
O





i2S ui(ti;(aK)K2P), where tS = (ti)i2S, aK =
(ai)i2K
A strategy2 of S in ￿(P) is a mapping ￿S : TS ! AS. Such a de￿nition
makes sense if the members of coalition S fully share their information in TS
before jointly deciding on an action pro￿le in AS. We justify such strategies
in the next subsection by showing that they can be derived from coalitions￿
mechanisms, which allow for appropriate transfers between the coalitions￿
members. Thanks to these mechanisms, utilities become transferable and
incentive compatibility conditions are satis￿ed (see proposition 1).
As in Ray and Vohra (1997) and Ray (2007), we de￿ne a coalitional
equilibrium relative to P as a Nash equilibrium (￿S)S2P of ￿(P). We assume
that for every P, there exists a coalitional equilibrium relative to P and
in case of multiple equilibria, we ￿x a mapping ￿ associating a coalitional
2In view of our application to auctions, we focus on pure strategies.
6equilibrium ￿(P) with every P.3 We denote as v￿(S;P) the expected utility




















i2N Ti. By evaluating (1) at the grand coalition N, we get







for every ￿ and P. (2)
v(N) is thus the ￿rst best Pareto optimal payo⁄of the grand coalition. Given
any coalitional equilibrium mapping ￿ and any partition P of N, ￿(P) is
a feasible strategy for N (i.e., ￿(P) 2 AT). Hence, v￿ is ￿grand coalition





v￿(S;P) for every P (3)
2.2 Coalitions￿mechanisms
Let us ￿x a coalition S. A mechanism ￿S for S is a pair of mappings ￿S =
(￿S;mS):
￿S : TS ! AS








3Ray and Vohra (1997) give su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a coalitional equi-
librium but their result is not useful in our applications to auctions. However, many
speci￿c results are available in this context (see section 3). Ray (2007) argues that the
partition form game only makes sense if a unique coalitional equilibrium can be associated
with every partition (possibly up to transfers). We rather take the view that in case of
multiple equilibria, some ￿standard of behavior￿allows us to select among them. Again,
this seems appropriate in the context of auctions.
7￿S is S￿ s decision scheme and mS is a balanced transfer scheme. As usual,
the interpretation is that members of S are invited to report their types to a
planner who then chooses a pro￿le of actions and transfers as a function of
these reports only4. According to Marshall and Marx (2007)￿ s terminology,
we use ￿bid submission mechanisms￿ , in which the bidders￿delegate their
decision power to a planner (as opposed to ￿bid coordination mechanisms￿ ,
in which the planner just recommends bids to the players).
We assume that utilities over mechanisms are quasi-linear. More precisely,
the utility of ￿S for player i 2 S, given his type ti, reported types rS =
(rj)j2S, a ￿strategy￿￿NnS : TNnS ! ANnS for the players outside S (e.g.,
￿NnS = (￿K)K2P;K6=S, for some partition P of N) and types tNnS for the




As this expression explicitly shows, every member i of S incurs an externality
from the strategic choices of the players in N n S but, thanks to the private
value assumption, does not face any direct informational externality. We
de￿ne the incentive compatibility (I.C.) of the mechanism ￿S given a mapping
￿NnS : TNnS ! ANnS. More precisely, ￿S is I.C. given ￿NnS i⁄for every i 2 S,
every type ti and reported type ri,
E
￿










This de￿nition makes sense because, in any coalitional equilibrium, coali-
tion S must take account of the behavior of the players in NnS in elaborating
its own strategy. In the case of complete information, S just looks for a best
reply to N n S￿ s action pro￿le. In the case of incomplete information with
private values, S looks for an I.C. best reply to N nS￿ s strategy ￿NnS, with-
out entering the details of ￿NnS (whether the players lie or not, how they
possibly gather into subcoalitions, etc.). The next proposition justi￿es the
coalitions￿strategies in the auxiliary Bayesian game; in particular, we show
that explicit I.C. conditions are not necessary. The construction, which goes
4Proposition 1 below only necessitates interim transfers, which are de￿ned over (the set
of reports) TS. In particular, we do not rely on transfers depending on the actual players￿
utilities as in A. Kalai and E. Kalai (2009). In this case, transfers also depend on the
players￿types.
8back to Arrow (1979) and d￿ Aspremont and GØrard-Varet (1979, 1982), has
been widely used in economic frameworks which do not involve externalities
(see, e.g., Forges et al. (2002)).
Proposition 1 Let S ￿ N; let ￿NnS : TNnS ! ANnS be an arbitrary strategy
of N n S and let ￿S be a best response of S to ￿NnS in ￿(fS;N n Sg). There




S(rS) = 0 for every rS 2 TS
2. The mechanism (￿S;mS) is I.C. given ￿NnS.
Proof: Let us ￿x S, ￿NnS and ￿S as in the statement. For every i 2 S;ti 2
Ti;aS 2 AS let us set
hi(ti;aS) = E[ui(ti;aS;￿NnS(e tNnS))]










j2Sni hj(rj;￿S(rS)). For every i 2 S; type ti 2 Ti,
reported type ri 2 Ti and reported types rSni 2
Y
j2Sni
Tj of the other members
of S,
hi(ti;￿S(rS)) + b m
i








= hi(ti;￿S(ti;rSni)) + b m
i
S(ti;rSni)
where the inequality is due to (4) w.r.t. the type vector (ti;rSni).
Hence, the mechanism (￿S; b mS) is I.C. given ￿NnS, but not yet balanced.
Let mi
S(ri) = E[b mi
S(ri;e tSni)]. By taking expectations in (5) we conclude that














S(rS) = 0 for every rS 2 TS. ￿
As a direct consequence of this proposition, we get the following
Corollary Every coalitional equilibrium can be made incentive compatible:
let P be a partition of N and ￿ be a coalitional equilibrium relative to P;
for every S 2 P, there exists a transfer scheme mS such that (￿S;mS) is











2.3 Core-stability of a (single) ring
Let us denote as P(K) the set of all partitions of K, for K ￿ N. Let R ￿ N;
from v￿(S;P), we derive the following characteristic function over R
w
R







In particular, for the grand coalition N,
w
N
￿ (S) = min
￿2P(NnS)
v￿(S;fS;￿g) (6)
We say that R is core-stable (w.r.t. ￿) i⁄ the (standard) core of wR
￿ , C(wR
￿ ),
is not empty. The interpretation is the following:
￿ The coalitional equilibrium mapping ￿ is given.
￿ The ring R considers to form; the players outside R are supposed to act
individually. R proposes to every i 2 R a share xi of the total expected
payo⁄ wR




), to be achieved by means of an
I.C. mechanism ￿R = (￿R;mR).
10￿ Every subcoalition S of R considers non-participation; if S does not
participate, the players outside R remain singletons, the players in
R n S partition themselves as they wish. Hence S can guarantee the
total expected payo⁄ wR
￿ (S) to its members.
￿ If the participation constraint of every S ￿ R is satis￿ed, R forms;
every player observes his type; R implements ￿R.
Basic properties
￿ Every singleton fkg, k 2 N, is core-stable.
￿ Recalling (2), for every ￿, wN
￿ (N) = v(N); by (3) and (6), wN
￿ is grand
coalition superadditive (N is e¢ cient in wN
￿ ). This property does not
necessarily hold for wR
￿ , R   N (see example 2 in section 3.3).
￿ C(wR
￿ ) corresponds to cautious expectations of the subcoalitions of R.
In particular, C(wN
￿ ) contains the usual variants of the core of the
partition form game v￿ (see Hafalir (2007)). For instance, the core with
singleton expectations, or s￿core, of v￿, denoted as Cs(v￿), is de￿ned
as the standard core C(fs










Similarly, the core with merging expectations (see Maskin (2003)), or




￿ (S) = v￿(S;fS;N n Sg) (8)
It readily follows from the de￿nitions that C(fs
￿) and C(fm
￿ ) are subsets
of C(wN
￿ ). Unlike wN
￿ , the characteristic functions fs
￿ and fm
￿ are not
necessarily grand coalition superadditive (see example 1 in section 3.3).
￿ Equivalent de￿nition: wN
￿ can be de￿ned in terms of the conjecture
of every coalition S on the partition to be formed by the players of
N nS if S secedes from the grand coalition N. For every coalition S, let
B(S) be a partition of N which contains S as a cell. Given a partition
form game v, let fB(S) = v(S;B(S)). The B-core of v is de￿ned as
the core of the characteristic function game fB. The s￿core and the
11m￿core correspond respectively to B(S) = fS;fjg;j 2 N n S g and
B(S) = fS;N n Sg for every S. The grand coalition N is then core-
stable (w.r.t. ￿) if, for some speci￿cation of the conjecture B(S) of
every coalition S, the B￿core of v￿ is not empty.











In particular, v￿(N) = v(N). The ￿￿core of ￿ is de￿ned as C(v￿) (see
Aumann (1961)). It is easily checked that, for every ￿ and every S   N,
wN
￿ (S) ￿ v￿(S). Hence, C(wN
￿ ) ￿ C(v￿).5 The extension of the de￿nition
of the ￿￿core to incomplete information may be delicate in the presence of
incentive constraints. In particular, our previous construction of transfers,
which made any coalitional equilibrium incentive compatible (see proposi-
tion 1), cannot be used for the maxmin, since the latter solution concept
requires that coalition S considers any possible strategy of coalition N n S.6
However, in the framework of standard auctions, the di¢ culties disappear.
Indeed, every coalition S guarantees itself a total expected payo⁄of 0, what-
ever the mechanism adopted by N n S, by having all its members bidding 0
independently of their types, a strategy that is clearly I.C. for S. Further-
more, S cannot guarantee more than 0, since the members of N n S can all
bid the maximal possible amount, which is I.C. for N nS. Hence, the ￿￿core
is well-de￿ned and not empty in standard auctions. But the usual objection
against maxmin strategies applies: why should S fear costly overbidding from
N n S?
5Hafalir (2007) focuses on abstract partition form games, which are not necessarily
generated by a strategic form game. Hence he does not distinguish the core with cautious
expectations from the ￿￿core. In our framework, at least under complete information,
Aumann (1961)￿ s original de￿nition of the ￿￿core can be used.
6Our construction applies to the minmax, i.e., to the ￿￿characteristic function, in the
sense that we can dispense with I.C. constraints in the best replies of the coaltion under
consideration.
123 Applications
In this section, we apply our solution concept to auctions with independent
private values. In the ￿rst two subsections, we consider standard auctions,
that is, without direct externalities. We check the core-stability of coalitions
in several speci￿c auction models which have been proposed in the literature.
In subsections 3.1 and 3.2, we illustrate that, in absence of direct externalities,
coalitions are core-stable. In subsection 3.3, we allow for direct negative
externalities. We show that the grand coalition can be made core-stable in
this case. However, the s￿core and the m￿core of the underlying partition
form game can be empty (example 1) and small coalitions may not be core-
stable (example 2). Finally, if externalities are possibly positive, the ￿￿core
may be empty (example 3).
3.1 Standard second price auctions




, 0 ￿ ti ￿ ti,
to be interpreted as his valuation for a single object. Ai = [0;M] is the set
of possible bids, where M ￿ maxi2N ti. Let a = (ak)k2N be an n￿tuple of
bids. A second price auction is de￿ned by the following utility functions
ui(ti;a) = ti ￿ max
j6=i










where ￿(a) = jfk 2 N : ak = maxj2N ajgj.
As is well-known, this game has an equilibrium in weakly dominant strate-
gies. More generally, let P be a partition of N. The auxiliary Bayesian game
￿(P) has a coalitional equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies described
by ￿k
S(tS) = tk for some k 2 S such that tk = maxj2S tj and ￿i
S(tS) = 0 for
i 2 S, i 6= k, for every S 2 P and tS = (tj)j2S. It is easily checked that for
every P and S 2 P,









13where f+ = maxff;0g. The previous expression shows that, at the equilib-
rium in weakly dominant strategies, the external e⁄ects disappear, so that v￿
reduces to a plain characteristic function. In particular, for every S ￿ R ￿ N




) = ’(S) and a ring R is
core-stable i⁄ C(’jR) is not empty, where ’jR(S) = ’(S) for every S ￿ R.
Proposition 2 (Mailath and Zemsky (1991), Barbar and Forges (2007)) In
a standard second price auction, all rings are core-stable.
Proof: Mailath and Zemsky (1991) establish that ’ is balanced. Barbar and
Forges (2007) further show that ’ is supermodular (convex). If the bidders
are symmetric, namely if the types e ti, i = 1;:::;n, are i.i.d., an easy direct
argument shows that giving the same amount
’(N)
jNj to every member of N





















































3.2 Standard ￿rst price auctions
In this subsection, we assume that the n initial bidders are symmetric, namely
that the valuations e ti, i = 1;:::;n are i.i.d. Let a = (ak)k2N be an n￿tuple
of bids. A ￿rst price auction is de￿ned by the following utility functions










14where ￿(a) is de￿ned as for the second price auction.
Obviously, given a nontrivial partition P of N, the players of the auxiliary
Bayesian game ￿(P) are not symmetric. By Lebrun (1999), ￿(P) has a
unique equilibrium, for every partition P. In other words, there exists a
unique coalitional equilibrium mapping ￿. However, no general analytical
solution is available.
Waehrer (1999, proposition 2) shows that for every partition P and every







In words, at a ￿rst price auction, the per capita expected payo⁄ of a cartel￿ s
member is greater in small cartels7. This result enables us to deduce the
following
Proposition 3 In a standard ￿rst price auction with symmetric bidders, the
grand coalition is core-stable.
Proof: We will show that the vector payo⁄ allocating the amount
v(N)
jNj to
every member of N is in the s￿core of the underlying partition game v￿. Let




. Recalling the de￿nition of the s￿core (see











while, from the grand coalition superadditivity of v￿ (recall (3)),




The latter two inequalities yield (12). ￿
7Waehrer (1999) also shows that for second price auctions, the inequality goes the other
way round.
15The previous reasoning can be applied to establish the stability of a bid-
ding ring R   N if v￿ is superadditive on R. Such a property indeed holds
in examples proposed by McAfee and McMillan (1992) and Marshall et al.
(1994).
McAfee and McMillan (1992) assume that e ti 2 f0;1g, i = 1;:::;n. They





























































￿ (S) for S ￿ R, with equality if S = R, the latter inequality
implies that every ring R is core-stable in McAfee and McMillan (1992)￿ s
example.
Marshall et al. (1994) compute fs
￿ by numerical methods in the case of
￿ve initial bidders uniformly distributed over [0;1]. Their table III shows that
fs
￿(S)
jSj is increasing with the size of S (i.e., (13) holds) so that, in their example
too, all rings are core-stable.
3.3 First price auction with complete information and
direct externalities
Following Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996), we consider ￿rst price auctions with
complete information, in which every bidder incurs an externality if a com-





16where Ai = f0;￿;2￿;:::g is the set of possible bids, given a smallest money
unit ￿ > 0. The utility functions are described by an n￿n matrix E = [eij];
for every i, eii ￿ ti is agent i￿ s utility for the object and for every i 6= j, eij is
the externality incurred by agent j if agent i gets the object. If all bids are
0, the seller keeps the object; agent i￿ s utility is normalized to 0 in this case.
Let a = (ak)k2N; the utility of player i is












for some j 6= i
= 0 if a = 0
To complete this description, we assume that if several players make the
highest bid, they all get the object with the same probability.




















Since ￿ is a game with complete information, the ￿￿characteristic function
v￿ is de￿ned by (9).
Core-stability of the grand coalition under negative externalities
Except in example 3, we assume negative externalities, i.e., eij ￿ 0 for
every i 6= j. In this case, given any strategy pro￿le (ai)i2S of S, N n S can
in￿ ict a negative payo⁄ on S by bidding over maxi2S ai; hence v￿(S) ￿ 0 for
S   N; since v(N) ￿ 0, the ￿￿core C(v￿) is not empty. A similar argument
shows that, for a coalitional equilibrium mapping ￿ proposed in Jehiel and
Moldovanu (1996)8, wN
￿ (N) = v(N) ￿ 0, while for every S   N, wN
￿ (S) ￿ 0.
8Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) prove that, under appropriate genericity conditions,
the following strategies (bj)j2N form an equilibrium in ￿: if ti ￿ minj eji ￿ 0 for every
i = 1;:::;n, then bi = 0 for every i. Otherwise, let (i;k) be a pair of bidders i 6= k such
that ti ￿ eki is maximal over all tj ￿ elj, j 6= l (that is, bidder i is willing to pay the
highest price for the object, given his valuation and the externalities he might su⁄er); take
bi = ti￿eki￿￿, bk = ti￿eki￿2￿ and bj < bk, j 6= i;k. At this equilibrium, which typically
involves weakly dominated strategies, bidder i￿ s payo⁄ is eki +￿ ￿ 0 and all other bidders
j 6= i get eij ￿ 0 (see Biran (2009), Appendix A, for a full characterization of equilibria).
17Hence, for that particular choice of ￿, the grand coalition N is core-stable,
namely C(wN
￿ ) 6= ;. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) establish the emptiness of
the ￿-core of a quite di⁄erent market game, in which all agreements between
the bidders and the seller are possible. Here, we stick to the original format
of the ￿rst price auction, so that we only allow for collusion between the
potential buyers.
At the above coalitional equilibrium mapping ￿, all conceivable cores
(e.g., the s￿core and the m￿core, see subsection 2.3) are nonempty. The
example below illustrates that this property does not necessarily hold for
coalitional equilibrium mappings which lead to possibly positive payo⁄s.9





t1 ￿2 ￿2 ￿2
0 1 0 0
￿8 ￿8 1 ￿8





Let us start with t1 = 8. v(N) = 2 ￿ ￿. Assume ￿rst that the bidders act
individually. Then the following strategies form an equilibrium: a1 = a4 =
8 ￿ 2￿, a2 = 8, a3 = 8 ￿ ￿. Bidder 2 wins the auction and the payo⁄s are
(0;￿7;0;0). Hence,
v￿ (fig;ff1g;f2g;f3g;f4gg) = 0, i = 3;4 (14)
Assume next that the ￿rst two bidders collude, while the two others remain








The following strategies now form an equilibrium: a1 = 3, a2 = 0, a3 =
3 ￿ ￿;a4 = 3 ￿ 2￿. Coalition f1;2g gets a payo⁄ of 3 so that
v￿ (f1;2g;ff1;2g;f3g;f4gg) = 3 (15)
9The features of the next examples depend crucially on the direct externalities. In a
￿rst price auction with complete information and no externalities, there exists a coalitional
equilibrium mapping ￿ in which the outcome (namely, the winner and the price) is as in
the equilibrium in undominated strategies of the second price auction. For that ￿, the
s￿core and the m￿core of v￿ are not empty. Furthermore, every bidding ring is core-stable
w.r.t. ￿.
18(14) and (15) imply that the characteristic function fs
￿ is not grand coalition
superadditive, hence that the s￿core Cs(v￿) is empty in that example.
Let us take t1 = 4. We now have v(N) = 1￿￿. Let us assume that bidder





where the ￿rst row corresponds to the utilities in case the cartel obtains the
object. The strategies a1 = 0, a2 = 1, a3 = 1￿￿, a4 = 0 form an equilibrium.
Hence
v￿ (f3g;ff3g;f1;2;4gg) = 0 (16)
and similarly for bidder 4. Let us assume again that the ￿rst two bidders





The strategies a1 = ￿, a2 = a3 = a4 = 0 are in equilibrium, so that
v￿ (f1;2g;ff1;2g;f3;4gg) = 2 ￿ ￿ (17)
(16), the analog of (16) for bidder 4 and (17) imply that the characteristic
function fm
￿ is not grand coalition superadditive, hence that the m￿core
Cm(v￿) is empty in that example. ￿
Core-stability of a ￿small￿coalition under negative externalities
Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) relate the case of two European ￿rms who
did not cooperate in a procurement auction opposing them to an Asian com-
petitor. They suggest that negative externalities might explain the failure of
the natural partners￿association but, as explained above, the emptiness of
the ￿￿core that they consider only shows that no stable agreement can be
found between the three potential buyers and the seller. In this particular
example, cooperation between the European ￿rms and the Asian one looked
unlikely, but the stability of the European coalition could be considered. We
illustrate below that, in the presence of externalities, a two ￿rm cartel may
not be stable.









If a ￿rst price auction takes place between the 3 agents, in every equi-
librium, agent 1 wins and agent 3 is the second highest bidder; in undom-
inated strategies, 10 ￿ p ￿ 12; at the lowest price p = 10, the utilities
are (￿5;￿4;￿3). Provided that p < 11, bidders 1 and 2 get a total utility
> ￿10. If they form a joint venture, in every equilibrium, agent 2 represents
R = f1;2g at the auction and wins; in undominated strategies, p = 12: the
price raises when agent 1 and agent 2 do not compete. The total utility of
f1;2g is ￿10, which is less than the sum of agents 1 and 2￿ s individual payo⁄s
(in our previous notation, wR
￿ (f1g) = ￿5, wR
￿ (f2g) = ￿4, wR
￿ (f1;2g) = ￿10).
The interpretation is the following: if agents 1 and 2 get together, they can-
not expect more than ￿10; if agent 3 plays a dominated strategy, they will
even get less. If agent 1 breaks the agreement, he does not expect that agents
2 and 3 (like a European ￿rm and the Asian ￿rm above) will collude, but
considers a noncooperative equilibrium between the three competitors. At
an equilibrium leading to the lowest price, he can expect ￿5. Similarly, agent
2 can expect ￿4. ￿
Core-stability of the grand coalition under possibly positive externalities
In example 2, the grand coalition is core-stable. If externalities are nega-
tive, the grand coalition can decide not to participate in the auction so as to
guarantee 0 to its members, a strategy that is not feasible for small coalitions.
More generally, the next proposition, proved in the appendix, states that, if
n ￿ 3, the grand coalition is core-stable w.r.t. every coalitional equilibrium
mapping, even if externalities can be positive. Recall that f+ = maxff;0g.
Proposition 4 In every 3-player ￿rst price auction with direct externalities
such that ti > e
+
ji for every i;j 6= i, the grand coalition is core-stable w.r.t.
every coalitional mapping ￿.
We conclude this section by illustrating that, if su¢ ciently many players
face possibly positive externalities, the grand coalition may not be stable. In
the next example, with ￿ve players, the ￿￿core, C(v￿), is empty.
Example 3: n = 5; every agent i has two neighbors (i￿1mod5, i+1mod5);
ti = 3, eji = 2 if agent j is a neighbor of agent i, eji = ￿2 otherwise.
20One computes that v(N) = 3￿￿. By symmetry, if C(v￿) 6= ;, the payo⁄
vector in which every agent gets 3￿￿
5 must be in C(v￿). Let us consider a
coalition of the form S = fi;i + 1;i + 3g where + is mod5, i.e., S contains
agent i, a neighbor of agent i and a non-neighbor of agent i. S guarantees
maxf3 ￿ ￿;2g if agent i bids ￿ and the other members of S bid 0; hence,
v￿(S) ￿ 2 ￿ 3￿ 3￿￿
5 , contradicting C(v￿) 6= ;.10 Hence the grand coalition
is not stable in this example. It can be shown that the same holds for all
coalitions of 4 players but that all coalitions of 2 or 3 players are stable, for
any coalitional equilibrium mapping in undominated strategies. ￿
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study collusion in auctions, possibly with direct externali-
ties, by associating a cooperative game to the initial Bayesian game modelling
the auction. Such a simple ￿semi-cooperative￿approach, which constructs a
direct ￿bridge￿between the initial noncooperative game and a cooperative
one, abstracts from the details of the strategic negotiation between coali-
tions (see Ray (2007) and A. Kalai and E. Kalai (2009) for recent discussions
of this issue). The partition form game v￿(S;P) constructed in this paper
is tractable and enables us to use a well-founded solution concept as the
core. The auxiliary game Bayesian game behind v￿(S;P) was considered in
Marshall et al. (1994) and Waehrer (1999) without any justi￿cation for the
absence of incentive compatibility constraints. The corollary of proposition
1 provides such a justi￿cation.
We give a precise content to the idea that ￿direct externalities make collu-
sion harder￿ . According to the available results, without direct externalities,
bidding rings are stable. Examples based on Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996),
i.e., with complete information, show that this property no longer holds in
the presence of direct externalities. A natural setup to pursue the analysis
is the second price auction with externalities proposed by Caillaud and Je-
hiel (1998), in which the valuations of the initial bidders are independently
and identically distributed. They show that if interim individual participa-
tion constraints are imposed, the grand coalition may fail from being ex post
e¢ cient but do not address the question of its ex ante stability.




S2S ￿Sv￿(S) ￿ 10
3 > 3 ￿ ￿.
21In this paper, we focused on independent private values. This assump-
tion, which is standard in the auction framework, plays a crucial role in
dispensing with explicit incentive compatibility constraints in the de￿nition
of coalitional equilibria (i.e., in proposition 1). In more general models, we
expect that ￿second best￿coalitional equilibria will need to be considered.
Our de￿nition of incentive compatibility can be extended to cover general
utility functions but the study of coalitional equilibria with I.C. binding con-
straints is potentially complex.
A Appendix: proof of proposition 4
Let us ￿x an arbitrary coalitional mapping ￿, namely, for every partition P
of N = f1;2;3g, a Nash equilibrium ￿(P) of the auction game in which the
players are the coalitions in P. We will show that the core with singleton ex-
pectations Cs(v￿) is not empty, i.e., that C(fs
￿) 6= ;, where the characteristic
function fs
￿ is de￿ned by (7).
Let us assume w.l.o.g. that player 1 is e¢ cient in N, namely that




￿(N) = [t1 + e12 + e13 ￿ ￿]
+
We will consider the modi￿ed characteristic function g￿ de￿ned by
g￿(N) = t1 + e12 + e13 ￿ ￿
g￿(S) = f
s
￿(S) for every S   N
and show that C(g￿) 6= ;. Let us set xi = g￿(fig), i = 1;2;3. xi is player
i￿ s payo⁄ at the equilibrium ￿ ￿ ￿(ff1g;f2g;f3gg) induced by ￿ in the
3-person original auction game. Since ti > 0 for every i, the seller cannot
keep the object at ￿. If player i gets the object at a positive price p at ￿,
xi = ti ￿ p < ti; if player j 6= i wins the object at ￿, xi = eji < ti by
assumption. Hence xi < ti. Furthermore, x2 + x3 ￿ e12 + e13. Indeed, if
player 1 wins the object at ￿, x2 + x3 = e12 + e13. If, say, player 2 wins the
object at ￿, the price p must exceed t1￿e21, otherwise player 1 would deviate
from ￿: x2 +x3 = t2 ￿p+e23 ￿ t2 ￿t1 +e21 +e23 ￿ e12 +e13, where the last
inequality follows from (18).
22Let us set11
y = (t1 ￿ ￿;qx2 + (1 ￿ q)t2;qx3 + (1 ￿ q)t3)
where q is computed so that
y1 + y2 + y3 = g￿(N), i.e., y2 + y3 = e12 + e13
namely
q =
(t2 + t3) ￿ (e12 + e13)
(t2 + t3) ￿ (x2 + x3)
From the properties of x2 and x3, q is well-de￿ned and 0 < q ￿ 1. We will
show that y 2 C(g￿). By construction, y is e¢ cient and individually rational.
Let S be a 2-player coalition. g￿(S) is the payo⁄of S at the equilibrium ￿S ￿
￿(fS;N n Sg) of the 2-player auction game in which S competes against the
singleton N nS. It is easily checked that, at every equilibrium of an auction
game with 2 players, the most e¢ cient one wins the object (see, e.g., JM￿ s
proposition 2). Let S = f2;3g; by (18), player 1 wins the object at ￿f2;3g, so
that g￿(f2;3g) = e12 + e13 = y2 + y3. Let S = f1;2g; if player 3 wins the
object at ￿f1;2g, g￿(f1;2g) = e31 + e32 ￿ t1 + e12 + e13 ￿ t3 ￿ y1 + y2, where
the ￿rst inequality follows from (18) and the second one from t3 ￿ y3 + ￿. If
f1;2g wins the object at ￿f1;2g, let k = 1 or 2 be the most e¢ cient player in
f1;2g, i.e., maxft1 + e12;t2 + e21g = tk + ek;k+1, where k + 1 is mod2. The
price p to be paid by f1;2g at ￿f1;2g must exceed t3 ￿ek3, otherwise player 3
would deviate from ￿f1;2g. Hence, g￿(f1;2g) ￿ tk + ek;k+1 ￿ t3 + ek3 so that
g￿(f1;2g) ￿ t1 + e12 + e13 ￿ t3 by (18); the proof is completed as above.
S = f1;3g is similar. ￿
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